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ADVERTISING AMENABILITY: CAN ADVERTISING
CREATE AMENABILITY?
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Scenario
When ABC Limited enters the marketplace with its new widget, it
will be operating on limited resources. Therefore, it will seek to limit
expenses by distributing its product in a small region of the country, per-
haps in only one part of its home state. ABC wants to continue this
policy long after it is established simply because the company views itself
as local in nature. In order to announce the arrival of its product in the
marketplace, ABC is considering advertising in magazines, in newspa-
pers, on the radio, and on television. However, as the company builds its
reputation, some consumers may hear about the product through adver-
tising that slips beyond ABC's intended market.
When consumers purchase ABC's product, they will expect a high
quality widget. Additionally, they will expect a well designed product
that will not malfunction. If those expectations are not met, and the
consumer is injured because of the product, the consumer will have the
option of commencing a lawsuit. If the consumer chooses to commence
a lawsuit, it will be most convenient to sue in the consumer's home state
where the laws are familiar, where a good attorney is within reach, and
where the courtroom is not far from home. If the consumer lives outside
the state ABC calls home, ABC may be subject to suit in a foreign state.
ABC wants to limit the forums where it can be haled into court because
it is equally interested in defending against the action in its home state
where its attorneys are familiar with the laws, the courtroom is nearby,
and the costs and inconvenience of defending in a foreign state are elimi-
nated. What are the choices for ABC and its out-of-state consumers?
Can ABC limit the forums in which it is amenable? Can the out-of-state
consumer sue ABC in the consumer's home state?
B. The Issues
In its 1987 decision, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,' the
United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of haling nonresident
defendant companies into the courts of foreign states. Justice O'Connor
wrote in a plurality opinion that there must be some evidence of "addi-
tional conduct" beyond placing a product in the stream of a foreign
1. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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state's commerce before that manufacturer could be haled into the
courts of a foreign state.2 Justice O'Connor identified some factors which
defined such additional conduct: designing the product for the state, pro-
viding regular advice to customers in the state, marketing through a dis-
tributor in the state, or advertising in the state.3 Many of these factors
would require conscious activity on the part of the manufacturer, such as
designing the product specifically for the forum state or marketing
through selected distributors; however, some factors may include gray
areas that could create in personam jurisdiction without the manufac-
turer's knowledge. Advertising is one such factor. Advertising that un-
intentionally crosses state lines could entice consumers to seek out a
product when the manufacturer never intended to increase the size of its
market. If such a product injures a consumer, both the injured party and
the manufacturer have an interest in whether advertising creates amena-
bility in foreign states.
However, additional conduct in the foreign state by the manufacturer
of a product may not even be necessary to create amenability in that
foreign state. Only three other justices agreed with Justice O'Connor's
requirement of additional conduct in Asahi.4 Justice Brennan led a sec-
ond plurality of the Court that required only the placement of a product
in the stream of commerce to create amenability in forums across the
country.5 In addition, placing a product into the stream of commerce is
not the only way that a company may create contacts with a foreign
state. A company may contract with a resident of another state to pro-
vide services, a company may engage in conduct, such as patent infringe-
ment, that injures a resident in a foreign state, or a company may
attempt to resell a product, such as parts for a collector car, in a foreign
state.
This comment examines the use of advertising to create amenability
in state and federal courts. It also suggests how plaintiffs and defendants
can determine whether a nonresident has sufficient contacts such that a
foreign state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident de-
fendant. This comment reaches beyond the factors in Asahi by consider-
ing a variety of situations in which advertising indicates that the
advertiser has purposefully availed itself of the laws and protections of
2. Id. at 112.
3. Id.
4. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices Powell and
Scalia.
5. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun. Justice Stevens
wrote a third opinion joined by Justices White and Blackmtin.
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the forum state. To exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, a state must have a statutory basis on which to hale the de-
fendant into court and the statutory basis must be consistent with due
process. This comment first examines in personam jurisdiction require-
ments in state long-arm statutes and the due process requirements deter-
mined by the United States Supreme Court. Because Asahi suggested
the importance advertising plays in creating amenability, the purposeful
availment requirements in Asahi and other Supreme Court opinions, as
applied by state and federal courts, are then examined. The next section
of this comment focuses on advertising and how it has been used by
courts as a means of justifying the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
over an advertiser. Finally, this comment recommends standards to be
used by courts when determining whether advertising creates sufficient
contacts with a forum to justify the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.
II. IN PERSONAM JURISDICrION ANALYSIS
Jurisdiction is, very simply, the power of a court to decide a case.
More specifically, in personam jurisdiction is the court's power over the
person. The exercise of jurisdiction is limited by the United States Con-
stitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process clauses. 6 If
the defendant challenges the court's jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing that the existence of in personam jurisdiction is
consistent with due process.7
The seminal case addressing in personam jurisdiction is Pennoyer v.
Neff In Pennoyer, the Court laid down the traditional circumstances
under which a court could exercise power over the defendant: consent,
6. As applied against the federal government: "No person shall be... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. As applied against
the states: "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. The plaintiff need only establish a prima facia case when the challenge is raised before
trial. See, e.g., Boit v. Gar-Tec Prod., Inc., 967 F.2d 671 (1st Cir. 1992); Gould v. P.T. Krakatau
Steel, 957 F.2d 573 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992); Irving v. Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 823 (1989); Moriss v. SSE, Inc.,
843 F.2d 489 (11th Cir. 1988). Once the case has gone to trial the plaintiff must show jurisdic-
tion existed by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc.,
854 F.2d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 1988).
8. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Pennoyer involved a dispute over attorney's fees. Mitchell sued
Neff in Oregon for attorney's fees Neff owed. Mitchell notified Neff by publication in Oregon.
Neff was a resident of California at the time. After receiving default judgment, Mitchell sold
land Neff had purchased in Oregon, subsequent to Mitchell obtaining judgment, to Pennoyer.
Neff then sued Pennoyer to recover possession of his land.
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presence, domicile, and quasi in rem jurisdiction.9 When a defendant's
relationship with the forum state falls under one of these categories, the
defendant is said to be generally amenable. 10 A defendant who is gener-
ally amenable in a state has a sufficient relationship with the state to
expect to be brought into court on any matter.
If the defendant has not consented to the court's jurisdiction and has
no property in the state, then a defendant's relationship with the forum
must be analyzed in terms of the contacts the defendant has with the
state. If the contacts are of sufficient quality, the defendant can be sued
on matters related to those contacts. This form of amenability, called
specific amenability, was first introduced by International Shoe Co. v.
State of Washington," where the Supreme Court held that some acts
"because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their com-
mission," may be sufficient to create in personam jurisdiction in foreign
states.12 Since then, an analysis of a nonresident's contacts determines
whether a nonresident is amenable in a foreign state.
In an action founded on diversity in the federal courts, or for any
action against a nonresident defendant in state courts, a two part process
is necessary to determine if the defendant has the necessary contacts to
be haled into that court. In Wuchter v. Pizzutti,'3 the Supreme Court
held that a state must have a statutory basis for exercising personal juris-
diction over nonresident defendants. Further, the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by the court must be consistent with due process. 4
9. Id. at 720. In rem jurisdiction is the court's power over the property. A class of in rem
jurisdiction is quasi in rem jurisdiction, which is the court's power over the person because of
the existence of property in the state.
10. However, quasi in rem jurisdiction can only be exercised over a nonresident defend-
ant when the property is related to the controversy. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977).
11. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
12. Id. at 318. For a discussion of the development of specific amenability and its current
status see Christine M. Wiseman, Reconstructing the Citadek The Advent of Jurisdictional Priv-
ity, 54 Omo ST. LU. 403 (1993).
13. 276 U.S. 13 (1928). In Wuchter, the Court ruled that a statute creating consent to
jurisdiction for all motorists using the New Jersey highways must also provide for nonresident
motorists to be given notice that suit has been brought against them. See also Hess v. Pawl-
oski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), where the Court ruled that such nonresident motor vehicle long arm
statutes were consistent with due process.
14. In actions in federal court based on a federal question, the exercise of jurisdiction
must still be consistent with due process.
1994]
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A. State Long-arm Statutes
To allow state residents to sue out-of-state defendants, state legisla-
tures have enacted long-arm statutes that provide a basis for personal
jurisdiction. There are two basic types of long-arm statutes, but they can
be split into three categories. The first type of statute allows jurisdiction
to be exercised to the full extent of due process while the second type of
statute enumerates the different bases for jurisdiction. Some states,
however, have enumerated long-arm statutes that have been interpreted
by their courts or have provisions which allow the state's courts to ex-
tend jurisdiction to the limits of due process. An overview of the various
states' long-arm statutes is considered below.'
1. Long-arm statutes that go to the limits of due process.
Only seven states have long-arm statutes which extend personal juris-
diction to the limits of due process. 6 They include Arizona, California,
Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Wyoming.' 7 In
these states, the statutory provisions for personal jurisdiction are met if
the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with due process.
2. Enumerated long-arm statutes.
The more traditional form of long-arm statute is the enumerated
long-arm statute. Twenty-five states have enumerated statutes specify-
ing each of the circumstances under which a nonresident has sufficient
contacts with the state for the court to exercise in personam jurisdic-
tion.' 8 These states include Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
15. Some states have other long-arm statutes, such as motor vehicle long-arm statutes,
which are not considered here. The statutes cited are statutes creating personal jurisdiction
over persons and corporations transacting business in each of the states.
16. A long-arm statute that goes to the limits of due process typically reads, "A court of
this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this
state or of the United States." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
17. ARM. R. CrV. PROC. 4.2(a); CAL. Cry. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); NEV. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 14.065 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4(e); OKA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2004(F) (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1985). Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-107 (Michie
1992).
18. A typical enumerated long-arm statute reads as follows:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who directly or by an agent:
(1) Transacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State;
(2) Contracts to supply goods, food, services, or manufactured products in the State;
(3) Causes tortious injury in the State by an act or omission in the State;
(4) Causes tortious injury in the State or outside the State by an act or omission
outside the State if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persis-
[Vol. 78:212
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Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin.19
In these states, the long-arm statute must provide a basis for the
court to extend personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Then the statu-
tory basis for personal jurisdiction must be analyzed to insure that it is
consistent with due process. Depending on the wording of the statute,
there may be times when the exercise of jurisdiction conforms to the
statute but is inconsistent with due process.2" There may also be times
when the exercise of jurisdiction is not provided for in the statute but
would be consistent with due process. Some states have provided for the
latter possibility by enacting an additional provision that allows the
courts to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by due process.
3. Enumerated long-arm statutes which also go to the limits of due
process.
Eighteen states have extended their enumerated long-arm statutes to
the extent allowed by due process. In some states the legislatures have
included "catch-all" phrases which permit this extension.2 In other
states the courts have interpreted the long-arm statutes to extend to the
tent course of conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from goods, food,
services, or manufactured products used or consumed in the State;
(5) Has an interest in, uses, or possesses real property in the State; or
(6) Contracts to insure or act as surety for, or on, any person, property, risk, contract,
obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be performed within the State at the
time the contract is made, unless parties otherwise provide in writing.
Mo. CODE ANN. CTs. & Jtm. PROC. § 6-103 (1989). Some states' long-arm statutes have more
provisions. E.g., Wis. STAT. § 801.05 (1991-92). Other states' long-arm statutes have fewer
provisions. E.g., HAw. REv. STAT. § 634-35 (1985).
19. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.05.015 (1983); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-59b (West 1991 &
Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104 (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193 (West
Supp. 1993); GA. CODE AN. § 9-10-91 (Supp. 1993); HAw. REv. STAT. § 634-35 (1985);
IDAO CODE § 5-514 (1990); IND. R. TRIAL. PROC. 4.4; IOWA CODE AN. § 617.3 (West Supp.
1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308 (Supp. 1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.210 (Baldwin
1991); MD. CODE ANN. Cis. & Jtm. PRoc. 6-103 (1989); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A,
§ 3 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 13-3-57 (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 506.500 (Vernon Supp. 1993); MoNT. R. Crv. PRoc. 4B; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510:4 (1983
& Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16 (Michie 1987); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 302(a)
(Consol. 1978 & Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.382 (Anderson 1991); TEx. Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (West 1986);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.28.185 (West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 56-3-33 (Supp. 1993); Wis.
STAT. § 801.05 (1991-92).
20. See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
21. A long-arm statute of this type includes a provision which states: In addition to the
provisions [listed above], a court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonres-
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limits of due process. The effect of these statutes is the same as those
that merely go to the limits of due process. Nevertheless, they are
unique because the enumerated portion of the statute still exists, even
though it is rendered obsolete by the interpretation or additional provi-
sion that allows the courts to exercise jurisdiction to the limits of due
process.
Nine states have enumerated long-arm statutes with a provision that
extends personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process. They include
Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Nebraska, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, and Tennessee.2 2
The courts of nine other states and the District of Columbia2 3 have
interpreted some or all of the provisions of their enumerated long-arm
statutes to extend to the limits of due process. The states using this ap-
proach include Arkansas, Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, North Da-
kota, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia.24 The courts in
these states may take one of two approaches to these statutes. In some
states the courts examine the enumerated provisions to ascertain
whether they are met and then proceed to determine whether jurisdic-
tion can be extended to the limits of due process.25 Other courts simply
ignore the enumerated provisions and proceed directly to a due process
analysis under the theory that if exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with
ident on any basis consistent with the constitution of this state and of the Constitution of the
United States.
22. ALA. R. Civ. PRoc. 4.2; ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-209(c) (Smith-Hurd 1993); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201 (West 1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704-A (West 1980);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536 (1989); OR. R. Civ. PRoc. 4; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322 (1981
& Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIwmD LAWS ANN. § 15-7-2 (Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. 88 20-2-
214 (1980 & Supp. 1993).
23. D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423 (1989); Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood
Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808 (D.C. 1976).
24. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-4-101 (Michie 1987); Hawes Firearm Co. v. Roberts, 565
S.W.2d 620 (Ark. 1978); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-124 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993); Safari
Outfitters v. Superior Court, 448 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1968); MicH. COMi,. LAwS ANN. §§ 600.701-
600.735 (West 1981); Sifers v. Horen, 188 N.W.2d 623 (Mich. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 543.19 (West 1988); Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717 (Minn.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1006 (1985); N.D. R. Civ. PROc. 4(b); Hebron Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick & Tile Co., 234
N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1975); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 36-2-803 (Law. Co-op. 1976); Triplett v. R.M.
Wade & Co., 200 S.E.2d 375 (S.C. 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24 (1993); Brown v.
Carnes Corp., 611 P.2d 378 (Utah 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1973); Chittenden Trust
Co. v. Bianchi, 530 A.2d 569 (Vt. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Michie 1992); Danville
Plywood Corp. v. Plain & Fancy Kitchens, Inc., 238 S.E.2d 800 (Va. 1977).
25. See, e.g., Classic Auto Sales v. Schocket, 832 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1992).
[Vol. 78:212
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due process, then the enumerated provisions of the statute are met as
well.26
B. Due Process Analysis
After identifying a state's statutory provision for asserting personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a court must still ascertain
whether asserting personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process.
Defendants brought into court through long-arm statutes must have suf-
ficient contacts with the forum state to be specifically amenable.
As noted earlier, specific amenability was introduced by the Supreme
Court in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington.27 In International
Shoe, the Supreme Court held that the "quality and nature" of a corpo-
ration's activities, to the extent that the corporation "exercises the privi-
lege of conducting activities within a state," give rise to the enjoyment of
"the benefits and protection of the laws of that state."8 "The exercise of
that privilege may give rise to obligations,.., so far as those obligations
arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state. '29 When
a corporation has conducted activities in the forum state, it is not unfair
for the corporation to expect to respond to a suit brought to enforce the
obligations created. Therefore, when a corporation carries on "system-
atic and continuous" activities in a state, sufficient contacts are created
"to permit the state to enforce obligations" which the corporation has
incurred there.30
From International Shoe, the concept of minimum contacts devel-
oped. A defendant who has sufficient isolated contacts with a state can
be sued on a claim related to those contacts.3' If the contacts are too
casual and isolated or the contacts are unrelated to the claim, there is no
basis for personal jurisdiction sufficient to comply with the demands of
due process. 32 Following International Shoe, Supreme Court cases defin-
26. See, ag., Defoe v. Larson, 389 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Parry v. Ernst
Home Ctr. Corp., 779 P.2d 659 (Utah 1989).
27. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe, the State of Washington was attempting to
collect unemployment compensation contributions from International Shoe. International
Shoe maintained that it was not amenable in the state because it had no offices, made no sales,
formed no contracts, and maintained no merchandise in the state. Salesmen employed by the
company who resided in Washington were directed out of International Shoe's office in St.
Louis, Missouri. The Supreme Court did not agree with International Shoe's position.
28. Id. at 319.
29. Id.
30. Idt at 320.
31. Id. at 319. See also Wiseman, supra note 12, at 419.
32. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318; Wiseman, supra note 12, at 419.
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ing when contacts are sufficient to support the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction have generally fallen into two categories: contract disputes
and tort claims.33 In each case, the Court attempted to determine if a
defendant's contacts show purposeful availment of the forum's laws, or if
the plaintiff's or some other third party's unilateral activity brought the
defendant into contact with the forum.34
1. Due process analysis for contract disputes.
Two Supreme Court cases, McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co. 35 and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,36 are particularly significant
when analyzing contacts in contract disputes.37 McGee is significant be-
cause the Court held that International Life's solicitation of a California
resident by mail, and the acceptance of his premium payments, was an
instance where a contract constituted a "substantial connection with that
[s]tate. ' 38 The Court later held in Burger King that when a party reaches
out and creates continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of
another state that party can expect to be "subject to regulation and sanc-
tions in the other State for the consequences of [its] activities. ' 39 The
Court looks for activities purposefully directed at a resident of a foreign
33. But see Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (affirming the concept of
presence in the forum state as a means of general amenability); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84 (1978) (holding that personal contacts with a forum state do not create amenability).
34. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In Hanson, a deceased mother had created a
trust with a firm in Delaware while living in Pennsylvania. She subsequently moved to Florida
where she died. A dispute arose over whether Florida or Delaware law controlled the disposi-
tion of the trust. The Supreme Court held that because the only contacts the trust company
had were made by their client, it could not be amenable in Florida.
35. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In McGee, a Texas life insurance company contacted a California
resident and agreed to pick up his policy after it had bought out the policy issuer. It was the
only policy the company issued in California. The Court found that the state's interest in
insurance and the economic benefit the company received from the policy justified the state's
exercise of jurisdiction. See also Wiseman, supra note 12, at 420-21 (discussing McGee).
36. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). In Burger King, Rudzewicz and a partner entered a twenty year
contract with Burger King to establish a franchise in Michigan. Burger King, a Florida corpo-
ration, included in the contract a choice of law clause that specified that the contract would be
"governed and construed under and in accordance with the laws of the State of Florida." d
at 481. When Rudzewicz failed to make scheduled payments and refused to give up the
franchise, Burger King sued in Florida District Court.
37. See also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), where passengers on
a cruise ship were held to a forum selection clause contained in a contract on the back of their
ticket. The result seems to favor business for, as Justice Stevens acknowledged in his dissent,
the forum selection clause was contained in an adhesion contract printed on the back of a non-
refundable ticket. Id. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
39. Burger King, 417 U.S. at 473 (quoting Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643,
647 (1950)).
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forum or.for the nonresident defendant to "purposely derive a benefit"
from activities with residents of a foreign state. When these require-
ments are met, the forum state can then exercise its "manifest interest"
in providing its residents with a "convenient forum for redressing inju-
ries inflicted by out-of-state actors."40 In Burger King, the Court sup-
ported these ideas by noting that purposeful availment "ensures that a
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 'ran-
dom,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts, or of the 'unilateral activity
of another party or a third person.' "41
Therefore, contacts sufficient to create specific amenability in a con-
tract dispute must demonstrate that the defendant purposefully directed
activities toward a resident in the forum state, and as a result of those
activities enjoyed the benefit and protection of the forum state's laws.
The defendant must be the one who reaches out and creates contacts
with the forum state rather than some other party who brings the de-
fendant into contact with the forum.
2. Due process analysis for tort claims.
Purposeful availment of the forum state's laws is equally important in
actions brought to the court on tort claims. Jurisdictional disputes in tort
claim actions focus on the targeted effects of the defendant's actions and
the defendant's attempts to "make-a-market" for its product.
Generally, the court looks for the nonresident tortfeasor to have en-
gaged in some purposeful activity in the foreign state. In Keeton v. Hus-
tler Magazine, Inc.,42 the sale of 10-15,000 magazines each month was
purposeful activity directed at the forum state.43
The Court also found in Calder v. Jones' that the "targeted effects"
of a defendant's actions, when directed at a forum state, can create suffi-
cient contacts for the forum to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the
40. ld. at 473-74 (citations omitted).
41. Id at 475 (citations omitted).
42. 465 U.S. 770 (1984). In Keeton, an employee of Hustler Magazine sued for libel where
her name appeared as a member of the editorial staff. Keeton brought her suit in New Hamp-
shire because the statute of limitations in both her home state and in Hustler's resident state
had run.
43. Id. at 774.
44. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). In Calder, Shirley Jones sued the National Enquirer, a Florida
Corporation, in California for libel over an article published in the paper. South had written
the article in Florida, relying on phone calls to sources in California for his information. The
600,000 copies of the Enquirer published in California, more than in any other state, had an
effect on the court's decision.
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defendant.45 The court held that when a defendant's actions are inten-
tionally aimed at a forum state, and the injury from those actions are felt
in that state, then the defendant must "reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there. '4 6 Therefore, jurisdiction is proper over a defendant
who has specifically targeted activity at a state and its effects are felt in
that state.
Perhaps the most controversial theory creating a basis for in per-
sonam jurisdiction is commonly known as the "stream of commerce"
theory. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,47 the Court reit-
erated the importance of purposeful activity on the defendant's part18
and held that foreseeability alone is not enough to create amenability.4 9
When the defendant conducts purposeful activity in the forum state, the
defendant has "clear notice that it is subject to suit there ....
Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor...
is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of
the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the
market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to
subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective
merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to
others.51
The test created by the Court with this language has come to be com-
monly known as the "stream of commerce" theory. It is better termed
the "make-a-market" theory because the manufacturer, by placing a
product in the stream of commerce, is making a market for the product.
The manufacturer can then expect to be sued for injuries caused by that
45. Id. at 789.
46. Id. at 789-90 (citations omitted). "In this case, [Calder and South] are primary partici-
pants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident, and jurisdiction
over them is proper on that basis." Id. at 790.
47. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In World-Wide, the plaintiffs purchased an Audi in New York
and drove it to Oklahoma. In Oklahoma the car was rear ended and the gas tank exploded.
In Oklahoma, the plaintiffs sued the manufacturer, the importer, the regional distributor, and
the retailer. The regional distributor and the retailer challenged jurisdiction. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court ruled that it was foreseeable that the goods would ultimately end up in
Oklahoma. Id. at 290-91. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.
48. Id. at 297.
49. Id. at 295.
50. Id. at 297.
51. Id. The make-a-market test is applied by looking downstream from the point where
the defendant contesting jurisdiction sits. If there is an unbroken commercial chain from that
point to the point where the product is sold to the consumer, then the defendant is considered
to have made a market for the product and is amenable in the states where the product is sold.
For further discussion of the make-a-market test as explained in World-Wide, see Wiseman,
supra note 12, at 426-29.
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product in any state that the manufacturer has attempted to serve as a
part of the product's marketplace.52  When the opportunity to review
the make-a-market theory came up in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Supe-
rior Court,53 the Court split its decision. As noted earlier, Justice
O'Connor, in a plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Powell and Scalia, ruled that when a product is placed in the
stream of commerce, additional conduct is necessary for the manufac-
turer to be amenable in foreign states:
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or
purpose to serve the market in the forum State, for example, de-
signing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising
in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular ad-
vice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product
through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in
the forum State. 4
Applying these factors to the case at hand, Justice O'Connor found that
Asahi did not have sufficient contacts to justify the exercise of jurisdic-
tion by the California courts.55 Justice Brennan disagreed with Justice
O'Connor and wrote separately, concurring with the judgment of the
Court. Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined his opinion. Jus-
tice Brennan concluded that Asahi established sufficient contacts under
the make-a-market test of World-Wide, but agreed that the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction over Asahi would not comport with "fair play and
substantial justice. 56 Finally, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices White
and Blackmun, also wrote separately. He concluded that the issue of
minimum contacts did not need to be addressed in the case because the
exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable and unfair.57 Even if
minimum contacts needed to be determined, Justice Stevens stated that
52. See also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
Helicopteros underscores the important difference between general and specific in personam
jurisdiction. In that case the majority opinion looked only at whether Helicopteros was gener-
ally amenable but Justice Brennan's dissent noted that specific in personam jurisdiction ex-
isted when general in personam jurisdiction did not.
53. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). In Asahi, a California resident sued Honda Motorcycle and
others for injuries sustained when the tire blew out on his motorcycle. All of the parties to the
suit settled except for the indemnity suit between the manufacturer of the innertube, Cheng
Shin, and the manufacturer of the tube's valve, Asahi.
54. Id. at 112 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
55. Id. at 112-13.
56. Id at 119-21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
57. Id at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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purposeful availment should be judged by the volume, value, and haz-
ardous character of the components.58
The Court's divided opinion in Asahi gave little guidance to lower
courts on how to apply the stream of commerce theory to product liabil-
ity cases. Justice O'Connor's opinion has the potential to alter the
course of stream of commerce analysis, which would increase the value
of advertising as an indicator of purposeful availment. Examining the
use of these Supreme Court decisions by lower courts is helpful to un-
derstand the standards lower courts use when determining whether a de-
fendant has sufficient contacts with a forum state to justify the exercise
of in personam jurisdiction. Examining Asahi may be particularly help-
ful to determine what precedential force it has for these lower courts.
III. PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT IN LOWER COURT OPINIONS
In light of the foregoing Supreme Court decisions, lower courts ex-
amine the activities of defendants for signs of purposeful availment. It is
important to note the general requirement that the defendant engage in
some act that shows the defendant purposefully availed itself of the ben-
efits and protections of the forum state's laws. Lower courts may either
survey jurisdictional decisions in support of their finding of minimum
contacts59 or focus on particular cases appropriate to the matter at
hand.6" In practice, cases often contain more than one cause of action;
therefore, both a contract and a tort analysis could be, but are not al-
ways, utilized by the lower courts.6 '
Given the splintered views of the Court that emerged from Asahi and
the impact that Asahi can have on product liability cases when advertis-
ing is involved, the lower courts' use of the opinions in Asahi are consid-
ered in detail in this section. If state and federal courts adopt Justice
58. Id. at 122.
59. See, e.g., Giotis v. Apollo of the Ozarks, Inc., 800 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing
World-Wide and Burger King), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1092 (1987); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v.
Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing Pennoyer, McGee, and World-
Wide), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986); Superior Supply v. Associated Pipe & Supply Co.,
515 So. 2d 790 (La. 1987) (citing International Shoe, McGee, Hanson, Shaffer, World-Wide
Keeton, Helicopteros, Burger King, and Asahi); Splaine v. Modem Electroplating, 460 N.E.2d
1306 (Mass. App. Ct.) (citing World-Wide, Hanson, and McGee), review denied, 464 N.E.2d 74
(Mass. 1984); State ex reL Circus Circus Reno v. Pope, 854 P.2d 461 (Or. 1993) (citing World-
Wide and Burger King).
60. See, e.g., Wines v. Lake Havasu Boat Mfg., 846 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Burger
King); Aries v. Palmer Johnson, Inc., 735 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. App. 1987) (citing Burger King).
61. See, e.g., Aries, 735 P.2d 1373 (relying mainly on contract cases). But see, e.g., Com-
posite Marine Propellers v. Vanderwoude, 741 F. Supp. 873 (D. Kan. 1990) (relying both on
contract and tort cases).
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O'Connor's opinion, it significantly alters the stream of commerce analy-
sis.62 Rather than require that manufacturers make a market simply by
placing a product in the stream of commerce, Justice O'Connor requires
additional conduct which would make it more difficult to bring a manu-
facturer into court, particularly component parts manufacturers who
have no contact with a forum state except for components they supplied
to another manufacturer.
A. Asahi in State Courts
State courts are as divided as the Supreme Court in ascertaining
which test to apply from the Asahi opinions. In one instance the appel-
late courts of the same state have taken opposite positions when apply-
ing Asahi.63 State courts have relied on the O'Connor plurality; they
have retained the make-a-market test set forth in World-Wide; they have
used both tests; and they have taken a variety of other positions.
1. Reliance on Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion.
Courts in five states, California, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania,
and Utah have relied on Justice O'Connor's requirement of additional
conduct in determining whether a defendant was amenable in the state.
In these cases the state court may either rely on the O'Connor opinion
as the holding of the court in Asahi, 4 they may rely on the O'Connor
opinion as "instructive" for determining minimum contacts,65 they may
rely on the O'Connor opinion because it is consistent with the state pre-
cedent,66 or, after careful consideration of Asahi and its use by other
courts, they may simply rely on the O'Connor factors as evidence that
sufficient minimum contacts did not exist.67
62. Justice O'Connor's factors have also been used in contract and tort cases based on
contract. See, e.g., Jarvis & Sons v. Freeport Shipbuilding & Marine Repair Inc., 966 F.2d 1247
(8th Cir. 1992) (breach of contract); Diamond Mortgage Corp. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233 (7th
Cir. 1990) (attorney's services), cert denied, 498 U.S. 1089 (1991).
63. Kohn v. La Manufacture Francaise, 476 N.W.2d 184 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (relying on
Justice O'Connor's opinion); Stanek v. A.P.I., Inc., 474 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(relying on World-Wide), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992).
64. Felix v. Bomoro Kommanditgesellschaft, 241 Cal Rptr. 670 (Cal Ct. App. 1987); Gra-
ham v. Machinery Distribution, 599 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 607 A.2d
253 (Pa. 1992).
65. Kohn, 476 N.W.2d at 184.
66. Witbeck v. Bill Cody's Ranch Inn, 411 N.W.2d 439,448 (Mich. 1987) (citing Hapner v.
Wehr, 273 N.W.2d 822 (Mich. 1978)).
67. Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corp., 779 P.2d 659 (Utah 1989).
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2. Reliance on all of the opinions in Asahi.
Two state courts, Alabama and Illinois, have relied on all of the opin-
ions in the Asahi decision.68 The Supreme Court of Illinois noted the
uncertain value of Asahi and said, "[I]t is not possible to determine from
Asahi whether the broad or the narrow version of the stream of com-
merce theory is correct."69 Therefore, the court looked at both Justice
O'Connor's and Justice Brennan's opinions to show that the require-
ments of neither test could be met by the facts in the case at hand.70 The
Alabama court followed a similar tack.
3. Retention of the make-a-market test from World-Wide
Volkswagen.
Five state courts, those in Georgia, Minnesota, Ohio, North Carolina,
and Washington, have rejected the Asahi decision and retained the
make-a-market test from World-Wide.71 These courts have retained the
test set forth in World-Wide because it was not overruled by Asahi,7
because the test set forth in World-Wide was consistent with state prece-
dent,73 or because the "splintered view of minimum contacts in Asahi
provides no clear guidance on this issue."'74
4. Other approaches to the Asahi decision.
States have also taken a variety of other approaches. The Supreme
Court of West Virginia relied on Asahi generally without adopting a spe-
cific test,75 the Supreme Court of Texas set Asahi aside and relied on its
68. Ex parte Pope Chevrolet Trans., Inc., 555 So. 2d 109 (Ala. 1989); Wiles v. Morita Iron
Works Co., 530 N.E.2d 1382 (Ill. 1988).
69. Wiles, 530 N.E.2d at 1389.
70. Id.
71. The Ohio court in its opinion gives no reason for adopting the World-Wide test. In
fact, the Ohio court adopts the language of World-Wide as quoted in Justice Brennan's opin-
ion in Asahi. Chace v. Dorcy Int., Inc., 587 N.E.2d 442, 447 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
72. Stanek v. A.P.I., Inc., 474 N.W.2d 829, (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1603 (1992); Cox v. Hozelock, 411 S.E.2d 640 (N.C. Ct. App.), review denied, 414 S.E.2d 752,
and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 78 (1992); Warzynski v. Empire Comfort Sys., 401 S.E.2d 801 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1991).
73. Grange Ins. Ass'n v. State, 757 P.2d 933 (Wash. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1004
(1989).
74. Continental Research Corp. v. Reeves, 419 S.E.2d 48,53 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting
Irving v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 823
(1989)); accord Showa Denko K.K. v. Pangle, 414 S.E.2d 658 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied,
1992 Ga. Lexis 188 (Ga. 1992).
75. Hill by Hill v. Showa Denko, K. K., 425 S.E.2d 609 (W.Va. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2338 (1993).
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own test to determine minimum contacts,76 and the Supreme Court of
Mississippi merely used the facts in Asahi to show that the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction was warranted.77
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in an attempt to avoid "areas of
unsettled jurisprudence," stayed with the basics and did not "predicate"
its result on the stream of commerce theory.78 Finally, in perhaps the
most unusual move of all, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky ruled that
the stream of commerce theory was "rejected by a plurality of the U.S.
Supreme Court in its consideration of the constitutional implications
involved. '7
9
B. Asahi in Federal Courts
The lower federal courts have been equally divided on how to ap-
proach stream of commerce contacts following Asahi; however, the clear
trend is toward Justice O'Connor's opinion. Only a few of the courts of
appeals have made decisions that have been followed by other courts,
which gives little indication of the courts' willingness to adopt a single
standard. 0 Some courts adopt the O'Connor plurality view, some courts
address all three opinions in Asahi, and other courts continue to follow
World-Wide Volkswagen because no majority opinion emerged altering
the stream of commerce theory.
The Ninth Circuit provides a good example of how confused the
lower courts are. In 1988, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a
judgment of the court in the Central District of California which held
that a Switzerland clinic's efforts to advertise and solicit business through
an agent were sufficient contacts to make it amenable in California.81
The court of appeals relied on Justice O'Connor's requirement of addi-
tional conduct in order to determine whether the defendants had suffi-
cient contacts.81 In 1989, the court in the Central District of California
used both Brennan's and O'Connor's test to show that sufficient contacts
76. Schlobohrn v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1990).
77. Wilkinson v. Mercantile Nat'l. Bank, 529 So. 2d 616 (Miss. 1988).
78. Lebel v. Everglades Marina, 558 A.2d 1252, 1254 (N.J. 1989); accord Davis Kidd
Booksellers v. Day-Implex, Ltd., 832 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
79. Halderman v. Sanderson Forklifts Co., 818 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).
80. E.g., Irving v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383 (5th Cir.), cert denied,
493 U.S. 823 (1989). This may also give the Supreme Court a good reason to review Asahi in
order to speak with a unified voice.
81. Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191 (9th Cir. 1988). Sinatra sued the
Enquirer and the Switzerland Clinic when the Enquirer published an article that said Sinatra
had visited the clinic. Id. at 1193.
82. Id. at 1197.
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existed.83 Later in 1989, the District Court of Oregon, holding that the
placement of a product into the stream of commerce was enough to cre-
ate amenability, ruled that a prior case relying on the logic laid out in
World-Wide was not overruled by Asahi and therefore was still viable.84
Based on that conclusion, the court concluded that the exercise of juris-
diction was proper under the make-a-market test.85 In 1990, in an
amended decision on Shute v. Carnival Cruise,86 the court of appeals
again relied on O'Connor's factors of additional conduct to find suffi-
cient contacts. 87 Finally, in 1992 an opinion from the Central District of
California finding that a Michigan bank did not have sufficient contacts
with California also relied on O'Connor's factors for determining
contacts. 88
The pattern developing in the Ninth Circuit surrounding the use of
the Asahi decision could be indicative of several things. It could reflect
sloppy research on the part of law clerks in the district courts. It could
reflect an acknowledgment that no single theory has been mandated by
the Supreme Court; therefore, either the make-a-market theory ad-
vanced in World-Wide or the additional conduct theory laid out in Asahi
are available to the lower courts for their use.89 As a result, when a case
appears to warrant a more permissive means of determining contacts,
courts use the make-a-market test. When a more restrictive test is war-
ranted, courts use the additional conduct test. The variety of approaches
could simply reflect how uncertain the courts are when applying Asahi.
Among the other courts of appeals that have encountered Asahi,
there is equal dissension. The First Circuit has relied on O'Connor in
two opinions.9" In the Fourth Circuit's encounter with Asahi, the court
83. Meyers v. Asics Corp., 711 F. Supp. 1001, 1006 (C.D. Cal. 1989). "No matter which
test from Asahi is used, Asics has purposefully availed itself of the protection of this jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 1006.
84. Western Helicopters v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 715 F. Supp. 1486 (D. Or. 1989).
Rogerson Aircraft heat treated the helicopter forks used by Western Helicopters.
85. Id.
86. 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
87. Id. at 382. This time Brennan's opinion is acknowledged in a footnote but is not
deemed controlling because O'Connor's qualifications are met. Id at 382 n.3.
88. Resolution Trust Corp. v. First of Am. Bank, 796 F. Supp. 1333 (C.D. Cal 1992). The
court found that the Michigan bank, which had inadvertently received transferred funds as
part of a national clearing house for bank checks, had engaged in no intentional acts in Cali-
fornia. Id at 1338.
89. In one case, a district court used both theories alternately in finding jurisdiction. In re
San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 742 F.Supp. 717 (D.P.R. 1990).
90. Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods. Inc., 967 F.2d 671 (1st Cir. 1992); Benitez-Allende v. Alcan
Alumino Do Brasil, S.A., 857 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1018 (1989).
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showed that none of the three opinions' tests could be satisfied. 91 The
Fifth Circuit has rejected Asahi and retained the standard from World-
Wide.92 The Sixth Circuit relied on O'Connor's test.93 The Eighth Cir-
cuit has merely adopted the purposeful availment and fairness tests from
Asahi,94 and in one case the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals relied only
on the facts from Asahi.95 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit has been reluc-
tant to take a position. In its first encounter with Asahi it relied on
O'Connor's test but noted that "if personal jurisdiction exists under the
narrower O'Connor test, it exists under the broader Stevens and Bren-
nan tests. 96 In its second encounter the Eleventh Circuit applied the
same logic noting that because "jurisdiction... [was] consistent with due
process under the more stringent" test, the court did not need to "deter-
mine which standard actually controll[ed] this case."97
If sheer numbers are any indication, however, the O'Connor opinion
is leading. The O'Connor opinion has been relied on in over fifteen dis-
trict courts in more than twenty cases.9' Six federal district courts have
attempted to satisfy all of the opinions, or at least both the O'Connor
opinion and the Brennan opinion.99 Three federal district courts have
91. Federal Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore, Inc., 886 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1989).
92. Irving v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
823 (1989).
93. Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 304 (1993).
94. Jarvis & Sons v. Freeport Shipbuilding, 966 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1992); Austad Co. v.
Pennie & Edmonds, 823 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1987).
95. Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1990).
96. Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 493 n.5 (11th Cir. 1988).
97. Vermueulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1548 (11th Cir. 1993).
98. E.g., Thorn EMI North America v. Micron Technology, 821 F. Supp. 272 (D. Del.
1993); Redwine v. Franz Plasser Bahnbaumachinen Industriegesellschaft, 794 F.Supp 1062 (D.
Kan. 1992); Narco Avionics, Inc. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1992);
Eugene Iovine Inc. v. Rudox Engine & Equip. Co., 786 F. Supp. 236 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Yates v.
Thrzin, 786 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Miss. 1991); Gould v. Empire Steel Trading Co., 765 F. Supp.
980 (E.D. Ark. 1991), aff'd, 957 F.2d 573 (8th Cir.), and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992);
Smith v. Intex Recreation Corp., 755 F. Supp. 712 (M.D. La. 1991), aff'd, 15 F.3d 180 (5th Cir.
1994); Bond v. Octagon Process, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 710 (M.D. Ga. 1990), aff'd, 926 F.2d 1573
(11th Cir.), and cert. denied; 501 U.S. 1232 (1991); Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 712
F. Supp. 48 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Cartwright v. Fokker Aircraft U.S.A., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 389
(N.D. Ga. 1988); Tomashevsky v. Komori Printing Mach. Co., 691 F. Supp. 336 (S.D. Fla.
1988); Andrews Univ. v. Robert Bell Indus., 685 F. Supp. 1015 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Walker v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Mead Corp. v. Stuart Hall Co.,
679 F. Supp. 1446 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Warren v. Honda Motor Co., 669 F. Supp. 365 (D. Utah
1987); Sollinger v. Nasco Int'l, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Vt. 1987).
99. Ensign-Brickford Co. v. ICI Explosives USA Inc., 817 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Conn. 1993);
Abel v. Montgomery Ward Co., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Va. 1992); Lister v. Marangoni
Meccanica S.p.A., 728 F. Supp. 1524 (D. Utah 1990); Wilson v. Kuwahara Co., 717 F. Supp.
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rejected Asahi in favor of World-Wide."° Note, however, that a few fed-
eral district courts have stuffed the ballot box, spreading votes among
various candidates.' 0'
The variety of lower court opinions applying the Asahi decision as
precedent demonstrates that the stream of commerce theory is in a state
of flux. Even though a majority of the opinions cite Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion, that tally is not ultimately controlling. 0 2 At some
point, the Supreme Court will need to review the stream of commerce
plus additional conduct and the make-a-market theories and take a solid
stance on the tests so that lower courts may feel confident in the law they
apply.
IV. ADVERTISING AS PURPOSEFUL AcrivlTY EXTENDING
AMENABILITY
Despite the lack of universal agreement with Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Asahi, advertising remains an important factor in determining
whether a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts to create amena-
bility in a foreign state.'0" Considering the many forms advertising can
take, businesses have thousands of options in choosing the type of adver-
tising for their products. This section discusses advertising in today's
markets and how courts have used advertising in determining contacts.
A. Advertising in Practice
For many companies, advertising is a source of business. It is a way
of communicating that the company has something to offer, and it is a
way to get the consumer to want that product. Today's market is com-
plex, but it is also carefully analyzed. Nationwide and local surveys tell
businesses what is selling and what is not.'" New businesses are en-
525 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Rose v. Franchetti, 713 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 979 F.2d
81 (7th Cir. 1992); Dittman v. Code-A-Phone Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
100. DeMoss v. City Mkt., Inc., 762 F. Supp 913,918 (D. Utah 1991); Curtis Mgt. Group v.
Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences, 717 F. Supp. 1362 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Wessinger v.
Vetter Corp., 685 F. Supp. 769 (D. Kan. 1987).
101. See, e.g., Redwine, 794 F. Supp. at 1062; Wessinger, 685 F. Supp. at 769; DeMoss, 762
F.Supp at 913; Lister, 728 F.Supp. at 1524; Warren, Ltd., 669 F.Supp. at 365; Wilson, 717 F.
Supp. at 525; Andrews Univ., 685 F. Supp. at 1015.
102. Another poll might be taken of the law reviews, which have published over forty
articles, most of them negative, discussing the Asahi decision.
103. Indeed, many of the cases which were decided after 1987, discuss advertising con-
tacts, and cited infra, notes 113-77, do not cite Asahi.
104. Volumes are available giving demographics for a variety of interests. See MAR-
GARET AMBRY, THE ALMANAC OF CONSUMER MARKETS (1990) (charting the growth and
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couraged to seek a "niche" in the market and to watch changing currents
in consumer needs.'05 The concept for business is simple. Identify the
product, identify its market, consult the demographics, and identify the
advertising method that reaches that market and use it.10 6 Of course, the
actual process can be much more complex.
Marketing consultants are quick to note that advertising is changing.
Consumers are now able to tune out many forms of advertising through
channel surfing or through the fast forward button on the video re-
corder's remote. 0 7 The best way to adapt to these changes, advertisers
are told, is to de-mass their marketing by " e-tuning... advertising to
tightly specific groups of consumers" and to think "innovatively about
newspapers, magazines and radio."' 0 8
Because of these innovations, advertisers are increasingly selective
about where and when they advertise. First, advertisers are looking for
new places and new ways to advertise. Rather than just relying on regu-
lar commercials between television programs, advertisers are searching
for ways to get on those programs or even for their product to become
the program. 0 9 Rather than running the same ad on television at differ-
ent times, advertisers are running different ads that match the style of
the program. For example, Coca-Cola is creating "weird, quick-cutting
commercials to show on MTV [and] wholesome heart-tuggers for adult
fare like Murder, She Wrote."" 0
Advertisers are also more selective when choosing media. Advertis-
ing in a magazine is not just about choosing a national magazine because
of its readers, it is about choosing a particular magazine because the
readers are most likely to purchase the product given the age, interests
decline of age groups and their wealth, education, income, line of work, and expenditures);
THm MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, CONSUMER ANALYSIS 1991 (an annual marketing guide to the
Milwaukee metro area covering the purchasing habits of Milwaukeans). Simmons Market
Research Bureau completes regular surveys of American buying habits. See SIMMONS MAR-
KET REsEARCH BUREAU INC., 1992 STUDY OF MEDIA AND MARKETS.
105. See, e.g, SHAWN McKENNA, THE CoMPErn GUIDE TO REGIONAL MARKETING 3-5
(1992); William Sunn, Survival by the Numbers, NATION'S Bus., August 1991, at 14.
106. See, e.g., JAMEs S. NORRIS, ADVERTISING, 25-35 (4th ed. 1990); McKENNA, supra
note 105, at 3-22.
107. Patricia Sellers, The Best Way to Reach Your Buyers, FORTUNE, Autumn/Winter
1993, at 14.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 16.
110. Id. at 15.
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and income of the magazine's readers.'1 ' Consider the following state-
ment by Yankee Magazine's advertising director:
Yankee has invested 56 years in understanding and coddling our
consumer to the ultimate degree. We love our subscribers and we
have an intimate relationship with them.... We may not be able
to help you sell a lot of your product in Arizona, but if you want
to sell more product in the Northeast, then hop on.... [I]f your
consumer and our reader are one in the same, then your advertis-
ing investment should reap rewards. 112
A business that knows its consumers should know how to target those
consumers in order to increase the effective reach of its advertising.
A plaintiff alleging the existence of personal jurisdiction through ad-
vertising should be just as aware of marketing, demographics, and the
reach or coverage of the advertising. 1 3 There are a number of sources
available to assess the focus of a particular medium. The first and most
valuable source for information is the advertising director of the medium
itself. Circulation figures are available from newspapers, magazines, and
journals. Relatively innocuous ads in local newspapers or on local televi-
sion may be reaching people in bordering states." 4 Every radio and tel-
evision station has a coverage map usually handed out to potential
advertisers boasting the power of its signal."15 These maps are based on
those prepared by each station's engineers for the Federal Communica-
tion Commission." 6
Other sources are also available for the same information. The Stan-
dard Rate and Data Service (SRDS) publishes monthly volumes detail-
ing circulation and audience data for magazines, newspapers, television,
111. These statistics can be provided by Simmons. See M1 SIMMONS MARKET RESEARCH
BUREAU.
112. McKENNA, supra note 105, at 118 (quoting Kevin Scully).
113. Reach expresses the number of "different people actually exposed only once to a
media vehicle" and coverage expresses "the potential audience of a broadcast medium or the
actual audience of a print medium." JACK Z. SISSORS & LINCOLN BtJMBA, ADVERTISING
MEDIA PLANNING 96 (4th ed. 1992).
114. See, e.g., Erikson ex rel. Erickson v. Spore, 618 F. Supp. 1356 (D. Minn. 1985) (Wis-
consin newspaper circulated 30-40 copies in Minnesota).
115. SUSAN TYLER EASTMAN & ROBERT A. KLiEN, PROMOTION & MARKETING FOR
BROADCASTING & CABLE 316 (2nd Ed. 1991). The coverage map of KCCI-TV located in Des
Moines, Iowa is reproduced for reference. Id at 318. A coverage map can be a persuasive
means of determining jurisdiction. See, e.g., Holmes v. TV-3, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 692, 696 (W.D.
La. 1991).
116. EASTMAN & KLIEN, supra note 115, at 316.
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and radio.117 These guides can prove invaluable when determining the
impact of particular advertising choices. The Spot Television and Cable
Source provides a market profile for each of the top markets in the coun-
try.1 " The market profile includes a map of the market area, provides a
demographic proffle, ranks the sales of merchandise, provides the Arbi-
tron ratings for local television stations, lists the names of radio stations,
and lists the names of newspapers published in the market."' The mar-
ket profile also identifies the Area of Dominant Influence (ADI) rank-
ing of the market. Arbitron identifies for each market the ADI.120
ADIs cover all the counties in the country whose viewing area is domi-
nated by the television signals from a particular city. Every county within
the range of a television station's signal belongs to one and only one
ADI.12 1
Circulation in magazines and newspapers can also be determined
through SRDS publications. The Consumer Magazine & Agri Media
Source contains circulation information audited by independent compa-
nies and the rate schedules for advertisements placed in particular
magazines."z Inspection of these materials can reveal many magazines'
policies for regional advertising as well as circulation figures for the mag-
azine overall and in specified markets.1 3 Through the use of these
materials, a plaintiff can show that an advertisement placed in a maga-
zine with national circulation actually appeared in a regional edition of
that magazine which targeted only a relatively small area.'24
These sources can be invaluable tools for attributing the actual audi-
ence targeted by a defendant. Combined with copies of advertisements
117. SRDS, SPOT T.V. & CABLE SOURCE (Dec. 1993); SRDS, CONSUMER MAGAZINE &
AGRI MEDIA SOURCE (Jan. 1994); SRDS, BusINEss PUBLICATION ADVERTISING SOURCE
(Jan. 1994); SRDS, NEWSPAPER ADVERTISING SOURCE (Jan. 1994).
118. See, e.g., SPOT T.V. & CABLE SOURCE, supra note 117, at A264-65 (showing the
Milwaukee, WI market).
119. Id.
120. HowARD J. BLUMENTHAL & OLIVER R. GOODENOUGH, THIS BusNESs OF TELEVI-
SION 300 (1991). Nielsen also identifies a Designated Market Area (DMA) that operates on
the same concept as Arbitron's ADI except that Nielsen will split counties where viewing
patterns vary due to "unusual terrain or the reception of peripheral signals." Id-
121. Id.
122. CONSUMER MAGAZINE & AGRI MEDIA SOURCE, supra note 117; ANTHONY F. Mc-
GANN & J. THOMAS RUSSELL, ADVERTSING MEDIA: A MANAGERIAL APPROACH 241 (1988).
123. For example, the information for People Weekly identifies 18 circulation figures for
separate editions, 8 of which identify Metro markets (e.g. New York, Chicago, San Francisco).
CONSUMER MAGAZINE & AGRI MEDIA SOURCE, supra note 117, at 486-89.
124. People Weekly's circulation data for the Chicago Metro area identifies only 17 coun-
ties in Illinois and Indiana. Id. at 489. See also SissoRS & BUMBA, supra note 113, at 248
(surveying the different possibilities offered by Time).
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from the appropriate media, a better argument can be made that place-
ment of the advertisement was purposeful activity in the forum state by
the defendant. Unfortunately, there is little indication that circulation
and audience statistics have been introduced as evidence in support of
the exercise of jurisdiction.1 25
B. Advertising in Courtrooms
Personal jurisdiction opinions which look to advertising as a means of
determining minimum contacts have relied simply on the existence of
the advertising in the forum state and the different forms that advertising
takes. But courts have often failed to consider who the advertising is
targeted at, whether the advertising reaches a large portion of the state
population, or if it was targeted particularly to the state with no inten-
tion of crossing state lines. Because advertising is being used to create
specific amenability in the foreign state, it is important to determine
whether the cause of action arose out of advertising for purposes of de-
ciding if in personam jurisdiction can be exercised over the defendant. 12 6
While advertising alone is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction,127 adver-
tising to the extent of solicitation, or advertising with additional contacts,
such as a contract or tortious injury, is sufficient.' 2 Advertising can be
grouped into three target ranges: national, regional, and local.' 29 Each
range represents a choice by the advertiser to target a particular market,
and the closer to the forum state the advertiser gets, the more likely such
advertising and additional contacts will confer jurisdiction. An addi-
tional concern is the judgments made by courts asked to enforce a judg-
ment from another jurisdiction. Courts seem more willing to refuse to
enforce the judgment of another court for lack of jurisdiction on collat-
eral attack.
125. But see, e.g., Holmes v. TV-3, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 692, 696 (W.D. La. 1991) (television
coverage map); State ex rel Miller v. Baxter Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 371 (Iowa)
(newspaper circulation), cert denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1990); Erickson ex reL Erickson v. Spore,
618 F. Supp. 1356 (D. Minn. 1985) (newspaper circulation).
126. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
127. Brokemond v. Marshall Field & Co., 612 N.El.d 143, 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); but
see Gavigan v. Walt Disney World Inc., 646 F. Supp. 786, 789 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
128. See, e.g., Aries v. Palmer Johnson, Inc., 735 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
129. One anomaly: An Arkansas citizen, who worked for a New York corporation that
had contracted with an Indonesian corporation, tried to sue an Indonesian corporation based
on a single advertisement in an international trade journal. Gould v. P.T. Krakatau Steel, 957
F.2d 573 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the advertisement was an insufficient contact with the forum state to satisfy due
process requirements. Id. at 576.
[Vol. 78:212
ADVERTISING AMENABILITY
1. National advertising.
Advertising alone in nationally circulated magazines does not consti-
tute purposeful availment and is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over
a nonresident. 130 However, the existence of further contacts suggesting
the development of a relationship with the forum state flowing from the
advertisement is usually sufficient to confer jurisdiction. But the number
of additional contacts necessary to confer jurisdiction with national ad-
vertising varies widely. The nature of the claim appears to have some
relation to the probability that in personam jurisdiction will exist.
A dispute over a contract in addition to national advertising is not
likely to confer jurisdiction. In Droukas v. Divers Training Academy,'3 '
advertisements in two nationally circulated magazines and a contract dis-
pute were not sufficient to confer jurisdiction because the nonresident
defendant was not transacting business under the state long-arm stat-
ute.132 Advertisements in nationally distributed newspapers, the New
York Times and the Wall Street Journal, were not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction. 33 Advertisements in national trade magazines, which target
a more selected group of consumers, were also not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction in a contract dispute.3 In Now Foods Corp. v. Madison
Equip. Co., the magazines Prepared Foods, Food Engineering, and Food
Processing, targeted businesses engaged in food preparation but was not
enough to confer jurisdiction. However, in Aries v. Palmer Johnson,
Inc., ' 35 an advertisement in the nationally circulated Sailing magazine
followed by the mailing of brochures, promotional literature, plans and
boat specifications was sufficient to confer jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant. 36 In Aries, the court found that the defendant's adver-
130. Witbeck v. Bill Cody's Ranch Inn, 411 N.W.2d 439, 445 (Mich. 1987); Now Foods
Corp. v. Madison Equip. Co., 386 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, 395
N.W.2d 926 (Minn. 1986); Hankins v. Somers, 251 S.E.2d 640 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979), cert de-
nied, 254 S.E2d 920 (N.C. 1979).
131. 376 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1978).
132. Id. (Massachusetts has an enumerated long-arm statute. MASs. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch.
223A, § 3 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993)); accord A-Connoisseur Transp. Corp. v. Celebrity
Coach, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 39 (D. Mass. 1990); Excel Energy v. Pittman, 606 N.E.2d 637 (1I1.
App. Ct. 1992).
133. Gehling v. St. George's School of Medicine, Ltd., 773 F.2d 539 (3rd Cir. 1985).
134. Now Foods, 386 N.W.2d at 363. The same result has been reached in a number of
tort cases. E.g., Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equip. Co., 927 F.2d 1128 (10th Cir. 1991);
Dalmau Rodriguez v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 781 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1986); Fidelity & Casualty Co.
v. Philadelphia Resins, 766 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986).
135. 735 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
136. Id. at 1378-79. The court also thought the $1.25 million purchase price was signifi-
cant. Id. at 1379.
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tising had risen to the level of solicitation. 37 On the other hand, placing
a toll free number in advertisements appearing in nationally circulated
magazines, thereby facilitating contact with the advertiser, still may not
bring the advertisement to the level of solicitation.13
In contrast, courts are more likely to find jurisdiction based on tort
claims, particularly personal injury claims.' 39 In one case, for example,
an advertisement for fireworks in the nationally distributed American
Rifleman, the purchase of those fireworks, and the subsequent injury
from the fireworks was sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 40 However, in
another personal injury case, Witbeck v. Bill Cody's Ranch Inn,'4 ' an
advertisement in an American Automobile Association (AAA) guide-
book and a telephone call to make reservations at the ranch were not
sufficient to create jurisdiction. 42 In contrast to Witbeck, the Colorado
Supreme Court, in Classic Auto Sales v. Schocket,' 3 held that advertise-
ments in nationally circulated magazines and a telephone call were suffi-
cient to create jurisdiction in a claim for damages from
misrepresentation.
Whether a claim is related to the advertisement is of equal impor-
tance to a determination of minimum contacts. Specific amenability re-
quires that the claim be related to defendant's contacts with the forum
state. 44 Therefore, where a claim is directly related to the advertise-
ment, such as misrepresentation, the court is likely to find that there
were sufficient contacts, even if the only contacts were advertising and a
phone call.' 45 But, where claims do not relate to the advertising, and the
advertising is the only basis for contacts, the lack of a related claim is
fatal. In Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mach. Co.,' 46 the Utah
137. Id
138. Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Vanderwoude, 741 F. Supp. 873 (D. Kan. 1990).
139. But see Wines v. Lake Havasu Boat Mfg., Inc., 846 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1988).
140. Giotis v. Apollo of the Ozarks, Inc., 800 F.2d 660 (7th Circ. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1092 (1987). The court of appeals based its ruling on "the much greater economic benefit
of multiple sales" but did not say how many multiple sales the defendant had made in the
forum state. Id at 667.
141. 411 N.W.2d 439 (Mich. 1987). In Witbeck, a visitor to the ranch fell off a horse, was
encouraged to remount by ranch staff, and fell off again.
142. Accord O'Reilly v. Prat's Travel AgencyInc., 457 So. 2d 24 (La. Ct. App.), cert. de-
nied, 461 So. 2d 319 (La. 1984); Blessing v. Prosser, 359 A.2d 493 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976).
143. 832 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1992); accord Rose v. Franchetti, 713 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ill.
1989), aff'd, 979 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1992).
144. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
145. See Classic Auto Sales, 832 P.2d at 233.
146. 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992).
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Supreme Court ruled that advertisements for replacement parts placed
in national trade magazines and sales of parts in state were not related to
a claim for injuries sustained from a machine manufactured by the same
company.47 A Massachusetts court also found that an injury sustained
in a hotel could not have arisen from an advertisement listing a toll free
number and a subsequent room reservation made on the toll free
number.14 8
2. Regional Advertising.
Regional advertising is particularly significant because it recognizes
intermediate markets. Radio and television signals often cross state
lines, thus stations which use these advertising mediums clearly create a
multi-state market for their products. Many metropolitan areas are situ-
ated on state lines, thus there would be little doubt that a company ad-
vertising in Kansas City, Missouri would be amenable to the courts in
Kansas City, Kansas. Disputes may arise, however, in situations where
the television or radio station is farther from the state line, or when re-
gional papers with significant interstate circulation bring consumers
across the border.' 49
In Ex parte Pope Chevrolet, Inc.,5 ° the Alabama Supreme Court
ruled that advertising in a regional newspaper, the Atlanta Constitution,
and advertising on WTBS, "whose programming is broadcast in other
states," as well as car sales totaling over $100,000 a year to Alabama
residents were sufficient to confer jurisdiction.'-' In a similar case, this
time involving Alabama's border with Mississippi, the Alabama
Supreme Court ruled that advertisements placed on Mississippi radio
and television stations whose signals crossed into Alabama were suffi-
cient to conclude that the defendants were soliciting business from Ala-
bama.' 52 However, when the amount of advertising crossing the border
is not significant, the courts are not as willing to extend jurisdiction. In a
personal injury case where the only advertising placed by the defendant
147. Id. at 1123.
148. Rye v. Atlas Hotels, Inc., 566 N.E.2d 617 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
149. See generally Robert T. Mills, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction Over Border State De-
fendants: What Does Due Process Require?, 13 S. liL. U. L.J. 919 (1989) (discussing solicita-
tion by border state defendants as a means of creating sufficient minimum contacts).
150. 555 So. 2d 109 (Ala. 1989).
151. Id at 113-14. The court does not consider that the rebroadcast of WTBS generally
occurs over cable TV which may decrease the audience size, that local cable companies may
not carry WTBS, or that local broadcasters may run their own ads over local ads run by
WTBS.
152. Lowry v. Owens, 621 So. 2d 1262, 1265-67 (Ala. 1993).
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that crossed the state line on a regular basis was in thirty to forty news-
papers, the court held that the papers were not sufficient contacts. 5 3
The fact that the cause of action arose directly from the advertising is
again a significant factor when the court determines whether the defend-
ant's contacts are sufficient to confer jurisdiction. In State ex rel. Miller
v. Baxter Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,'54 the State of Iowa sued Omaha, Ne-
braska car dealers for false advertising. 55 The court ruled that adver-
tisements placed in the Omaha World Herald and on Omaha television
stations were sufficient contacts to justify the extension of jurisdiction
over the auto dealers. Particularly significant were the circulation
figures provided to the court which showed that over 30,000 Iowans sub-
scribed to the Sunday World Herald.
In many of the cases where there is regional advertising it is likely
that there will also be advertising in mediums within the forum state. In
these cases there can be little doubt that the defendant engaged in pur-
poseful activity in the forum state. For example, in Harriman v. Demou-
las Supermarkets,s7 the defendant advertised on four New Hampshire
radio stations with signals that reached Maine, advertised in New Hamp-
shire and Massachusetts newspapers with circulation in Maine, and ad-
vertised in the York County Coast Star published in Kennebunk,
Maine.158
Some regional advertising, however, will not extend jurisdiction be-
yond the targeted region, even when the targeted region borders the
state where the plaintiff is seeking jurisdiction over the defendant. In
Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning,159 a Pennsylvania ski resort devoted its
advertising budget to Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey. Mary-
land newspapers, on their own initiative, printed information carried on
the wire services regarding the snow conditions at the ski resort. Mary-
land ski shops were supplied with brochures from the resort, often re-
153. Erickson ex rel Erikson v. Spore, 618 F.Supp. 1356 (D. Minn. 1985).
154. 456 N.W.2d 371 (Iowa), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1990).
155. Omaha, Nebraska is directly across the border from Council Bluffs, Iowa. The two
cities are considered a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area by the U.S. Census Bureau. Id
at 374 n1.
156. Id. at 377.
157. See Harriman v. Demoulas Supermarkets, Inc., 518 A.2d 1035 (Me. 1986), cert de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987).
158. Accord Soares v. Roberts, 417 F. Supp. 304 (D.R.I. 1976). In Soares, the defendant
advertised in Boston newspapers that circulated in Rhode Island, advertised on Boston televi-
sion stations with signals that reached Rhode Island, and advertised in the Providence, Rhode
Island Sunday JournaL
159. 539 A.2d 1107 (Md.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988).
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questing them. The resort also maintained a toll free number for
Maryland because it was included in a package deal the resort
purchased. The Maryland toll free number was included on the
brochures.16 The Maryland court held that these contacts were insuffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction.
In Harold Howard Farms v. Hoffman, 61 a livestock breeder adver-
tised in a national quarter horse journal and in a Michigan journal, both
of which the plaintiff received. The Indiana court ruled that "to hold
that an advertiser in a Michigan publication has made a significant con-
tact with an Indiana subscriber through the advertisement stretches the
bounds of due process."'162 These cases show that when the plaintiff
removes the advertising from its intended market, the courts will not
extend the borders of the market to create amenability.
3. Local advertising.
When nonresidents advertise in another state, they are clearly at-
tempting to create a market in that state, especially when they have cho-
sen a medium that focuses on the state's residents: a state newspaper, a
radio station, or a television station. The biggest bar to the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction occurs when the nonresident advertises in the fo-
rum state, but the cause of action does not arise out of the
advertisement.
Even when the advertisement appears in state, courts are still reluc-
tant to base jurisdiction on the advertisement alone. Thus, Marshall
Field's advertisements in Indiana were not sufficient to support a tort
claim for injuries caused in Illinois. 63 An advertisement for employ-
ment outside of Alabama was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction.' 64 A
Massachusetts hospital's yellow page advertisement in Connecticut was
not a sufficient contact to confer jurisdiction. 65 The state long-arm stat-
ute may also stand in the way of jurisdiction. Despite advertisements in
the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago yellow pages, Cunard Cruise Lines
was found not to be transacting business in Illinois.166
160. Id. at 1108-09.
161. 585 N.E.2d 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
162. Id. at 21.
163. Brokemond v. Marshall Field & Co., 612 N.E.2d 143 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); accord
Bayles v. K-Mart Corp., 636 F. Supp. 852 (D.D.C. 1986).
164. Johnston v. Frank E. Basil, Inc., 802 F.2d 418 (11th Cir. 1986).
165. Cote v. Gordon, 478 A.2d 631 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); contra Hull v. Gamblin, 241
A.2d 739 (D.C. 1968).
166. Wiedemann v. Cunard Line Ltd., 380 N.E.2d 932 (111. App. Ct. 1978).
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When a business regularly advertises in the state, courts have found
jurisdiction to be proper. Therefore, when a Wisconsin bar advertised in
a monthly newspaper, the Illinois Entertainer, and maintained an Illinois
phone number for the bar, the court found sufficient contacts for its ex-
ercise of jurisdiction. 167 When a Colorado truck dealer advertised in an
Oregon sales catalog and misrepresented the truck's features, an Oregon
court found sufficient contacts for jurisdiction.'68 An Arizona school
was found to be amenable in Texas based on advertisements in Texas
phone books, advertisements in a number of national magazines, and a
policy of immediately sending out information packets with applications
to people who contacted the school.169 Walt Disney World's four page
advertisement in the Philadelphia Inquirer with a toll free number pro-
vided for reservations, advertisements run on local television stations,
and the presentation of honorary Disney World citizenship to the Mayor
of Philadelphia were sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 70 Finally, a full
scale campaign to open a market in the state creates sufficient contacts
for jurisdiction. An Indiana boat company that advertised in national
magazines, displayed its boats at a Chicago boat show, and sold its boats
through Illinois retailers had sufficient contacts for Illinois courts to ex-
ercise in personam jurisdiction.' 7'
If the claim is not related to the advertising upon which jurisdiction is
based, the courts still have no power to hear the case. Therefore, when a
Kansas resident got sick from the food served on her Carnival cruise, the
court ruled that the negligent preparation of the food did not arise from
Carnival Cruise's advertisements in Kansas because the duty to exercise
due care did not arise until after she became a passenger on the ship. 172
In the State of Washington, a contract with a Louisiana company to re-
condition a boat was held not to arise out of advertisements in regional
and national magazines. 73 When a bar patron had too much to drink in
167. Wimmer v. Koenigseder, 470 N.E.2d 326 (Il. App. Ct. 1984), rev'd on other grounds,
484 N.E.2d 1088 (11. 1985).
168. Marvel v. Pennington GMC, Inc., 780 P.2d 760 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
169. Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1982).
170. Gavigan v. Walt Disney World Co., 630 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd on reh'g, 646 F.
Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
171. Clements v. Barney's Sporting Good Store, 406 N.E.2d 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
172. Dirks v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 642 F. Supp. 971 (D. Kan. 1986); accord Pizarro v.
Hoteles Concorde Int'l, C.A., 907 F.2d 1256 (1st Cir. 1990); Szakacs v. Anheuser-Busch Cos.,
644 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ind. 1986); State ex. reL Circus Circus Reno v. Pope, 854 P.2d 461 (Or.
1993); contra Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 383-86 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that
but for the advertisements, the Shutes would not have gone on the cruise), rev'd on other
grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
173. MBM Fisheries v. Bollinger Mach., Shop, 804 P.2d 627 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
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a Canadian bar, a Michigan court held that the resulting injuries did not
arise out of advertisements placed in Michigan newspapers. 174 Nonethe-
less, when a Mississippi faimer saw an ad in a local paper for feed made
by a Louisiana company, the court found that the subsequent injury did
arise out of the advertisement.175 Similarly, an Ohio resident's injuries
due to the negligence of a doctor at the City of Faith Hospital in
Oklahoma were held to arise out of endorsements made on Oral Rob-
ert's "Expect a Miracle" show.1 76
4. Collateral attack.
Jurisdiction can also be challenged on collateral attack. After a court
in a foreign state has entered default judgment, the defendant can chal-
lenge the court's verdict when the plaintiff tries to enforce the judgment.
Usually, such a challenge will happen in the defendant's home state. Be-
cause the courts in these actions are trying to determine whether the
court in another state had jurisdiction, it must apply the laws of the other
jurisdiction to its determination. 77 However, courts have difficulty ap-
plying the laws of other states in these determinations.
In Kleinfeld v. Link, 8 an Ohio resident challenged the judgment of
an Alaska court. Link had placed an advertisement in the nationally
circulated Shutterbug News. He sold a camera to Kleinfeld, but when
the camera arrived in Alaska it was damaged. The Ohio court held that
jurisdiction was improperly based on the single contact of the advertise-
ment. The court never attempted to apply or interpret Alaska law. In
Splaine v. Modem Electroplating,179 a Massachusetts court found that
the exercise of jurisdiction by a Michigan court was improper based on
an advertisement in a nationally circulated magazine, Hemming's Motor
News. In this case, the Massachusetts court considered Michigan law in
making its determination. Finally, in A.A.A., Inc. v. Lindberg,180 a Geor-
gia court, applying Illinois law, reviewed a default judgment from an Illi-
nois court. A.A.A. was in the business of selling "wrecked, exotic cars"
and advertised in the New York Times, Car & Driver, Auto Week, Road
174. Mozdy v. Lopez, 494 N.W.2d 866 (Mich Ct. App. 1992).
175. Rippy v. Crescent Feed Commodities, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
176. Creech v. Roberts, 908 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 499 U.S. 975 (1991).
177. The question is not whether the reviewing court would or could exercise jurisdiction,
the question is whether the court that entered the default judgment would or could exercise
jurisdiction.
178. 457 N.E.2d 1187 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
179. 460 N.E.2d 1306 (App. Ct.), review denied, 464 N.E.2d 74 (Mass. 1984).
180. 324 S.E.2d 480 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
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& Track, the Atlanta Constitution, and the Chicago Tribune.'8 ' Lindberg
had purchased a wrecked Mercedes and sued for breach of contract and
fraud when he determined that the damage to the car was more substan-
tial than A.A.A. had told him. Focusing on facts that indicated these
were all nationally circulated publications, the Georgia court ruled that
the advertisements, subsequent phone calls to arrange a purchase, and
the contract for purchase were not sufficient contacts to confer jurisdic-
tion. Illinois courts might view the case differently.182
These cases tend to show that a nonresident defendant without sub-
stantial contacts may be more likely to win a challenge to jurisdiction in
the defendant's home state. A plaintiff seeking to enforce a default
judgment in another state should be well armed with precedent support-
ing the existence of in personam jurisdiction in the plaintiff's home state.
A judgment that may not hold up for lack of jurisdiction in the plain-
tiff's home state will not be enforced in the defendant's home state.
V. Tim FUTURE OF ADVERTISING AMENABILITY
Given the variety of holdings by courts, it may be difficult to deter-
mine when advertising, combined with other contacts, creates sufficient
grounds for a court to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a defend-
ant. The problem with personal jurisdiction is that there are no bright
lines. Each defendant's contacts must be examined separately to deter-
mine whether the contacts are sufficient for the forum court to exercise
jurisdiction. However, there are certain factors that courts routinely
consider when determining whether advertising rises to a level sufficient
to confer jurisdiction. The more significant the contacts under each of
these factors, the more likely the court will find the defendant amenable.
The following factors are or should be considered by courts in making
their determinations: The target of the advertising, the amount of adver-
tising placed in the forum state, how the advertising arrived in the forum
state, the amount of business resulting from the advertisement in the
forum state, the extent of the other contacts, and how closely related the
advertising is to the claim.
Where the advertisement was placed is an indication of the advertise-
ment's target. When an advertiser places an ad in a national magazine,
the advertiser is creating a national market for its product or service.
However, an advertisement may appear to be a nationwide ad when it is
181. Il at 481.
182. See Rose v. Franchetti, 713 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. 111. 1989), aff'd, 979 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.
1992).
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actually a local ad.183 The advertisement and the medium should be
carefully scrutinized to determine if the advertisement is more targeted
than it appears. Some national magazines have regional editions, and the
ad in question may have been placed only in the regional edition. Some
magazines have national circulation but have particular regional appeal.
An ad placed in The New Yorker may be a more persuasive contact in
states surrounding New York than in Colorado. A television ad for a
nationally recognized name like Walt Disney World may have been run
by the network, or it may have been run by the local affiliate.184 If the
ad focuses on the locale, it may have been specially placed for that mar-
ket. The mention of the forum state, a city in the forum state, or the
depiction of a local landmark are good indications that the ad is target-
ing the forum state.
The amount and frequency of advertising in a forum state can equal
solicitation of the forum's residents.' 85 A single ad placed in a national
magazine will not have much effect on a single state's residents. Ads
that reach thirty to forty state residents on a regular basis will not have
as much effect as ads that reach 30,000 residents every week. 86 An ad
that is run daily is much more effective for a finding of jurisdiction than
an ad that is run monthly, and an ad that is run monthly is more effective
than an ad that is run yearly.'8 7 The more ads that are run in a forum
state, the greater the likelihood that the ads with other contacts will con-
fer jurisdiction, but without circulation or audience statistics courts have
little basis for their determinations.
How an advertisement arrived in the forum state should also be con-
sidered. An advertisement which is unilaterally brought into the state by
the plaintiff carries little weight. A good example is newspaper circula-
tion. With the exception of a few papers with national circulation, such
as the New York Times, USA Today, or the Wall Street Journal, most
papers are targeted at a specific market. But a person planning a move
may subscribe to a paper in order to get to know the new area before the
183. See Gavigan v. Walt Disney World Inc., 646 F. Supp. 786, 788 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (Ads
for Disney World were placed with local CBS affiliate).
184. Id.
185. See Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equip. Co., 927 F.2d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a record containing no information regarding the extent of advertising leaves no
basis for determining whether the advertising establishes minimum contacts.)
186. Compare State ex reL Miller v. Baxter Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 371
(Iowa), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1990) with Erickson ex reL Erickson v. Spore, 618 F. Supp.
1356 (D. Minn. 1985).
187. See eg., W'nmer v. Koenigseder, 470 N.E.2d 326 (App. Ct. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 484 N.E.2d 1088 (Ill. 1985).
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move. Many colleges, as a service to their students, also subscribe to
newspapers that have little national circulation. Because it was not the
intention of the advertiser to create a market beyond the usual market
for some advertising mediums, advertisements circulated outside their
intended market through the unilateral activity of the plaintiff should be
given no weight when determining contacts.188
The amount of business resulting from the advertisement in the fo-
rum state will increase the likelihood that the advertising creates suffi-
cient contacts.189 Therefore, when a business derives hundreds of sales
from the advertising, 190 has established ties with retailers in the state,191
has taken in over $100,000 from sales after advertising, 92 or has made a
sale for a substantial amount of money, a finding of jurisdiction is more
likely.193 On the other hand, when no sales have been made as a result
of the advertising, jurisdiction is less likely. 94 A defendant should be
prepared to answer questions about the volume of business resulting
from advertising that was calculated to reach a forum state. The result-
ing figures may help courts determine whether a substantial market has
been created or if the market created has resulted in random sales.
Because advertising alone is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction, 95
the extent of additional contacts are also important. The amount of ad-
ditional contacts needed depending on the extent of the advertising. If
there is only one ad in national media, then additional contacts will need
to be substantial. The existence of only one ad, however, may be suffi-
cient if the additional contacts constitute tortious conduct such as mis-
representation. 96 If the number of advertisements placed rise to the
level of solicitation, then additional contacts may not have to be as
great. 197 The need for additional contacts is relative to the extent of the
advertising in the forum state.
188. See, e.g., Harold Howard Farms v. Hoffman, 585 N.E.2d 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992);
Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning, 539 A.2d 1107 (Md. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988).
189. See Williams, 927 F.2d at 1131 (holding that a record containing no information re-
garding how much business was derived from advertising gives no basis for determining
whether the advertising establishes minimum contacts).
190. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 775 F.2d 638, 639 (5th Cir. 1985).
191. Clements v. Barney's Sporting Goods Store, 406 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
192. Ex parte Pope Chevrolet, Inc., 555 So. 2d 109, 113 (Ala. 1989).
193. Aries v. Palmer Johnson, Inc., 735 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
194. MBM Fisheries v. Bollinger Mach. Shop, 804 P.2d 627 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
195. Brokemond v. Marshall Field & Co., 612 N.E.2d 143 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); but see
Gavigan v. Walt Disney World Inc., 646 F. Supp. 786, 789 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
196. Rose v. Franchetti, 713 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 979 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.
1992).
197. Aries, 735 P.2d at 1379.
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The final bar to a finding of jurisdiction is when the cause of action
does not arise out of the advertising. Courts read this requirement dif-
ferently, and those differences are best illustrated by tort cases involving
hotels and other service establishments. In some cases the courts rule
that the tortious activities of the hotel staff do not arise out of or relate
to the advertising activities in the forum.19s These courts may also note
that the duty to the patron does not arise until the patron arrives at the
establishment.'99 However, some courts use a more permissive test: If
but for the advertising the cause of action would not have existed, then
the claim is related to the contacts." 0 In these situations, if the adver-
tisements induced the patron to go to the hotel, then the claim is related
to the advertisements. It is important to know which test is appropriate
in the forum where jurisdiction is being contested.
If a plaintiff can show substantial advertising in the forum state that
successfully produced sales for the defendant and was related to the
cause of action, then the plaintiff should have no trouble meeting the
burden of proof. It is important for the plaintiff to clearly present both
the evidence and the nature and extent of the advertising to the court.201
If the advertising appears to be national, a court will most likely assume,
absent evidence to the contrary, that the advertising is indeed national.
Ultimately, a finding for the plaintiff rests on how well the evidence is
presented.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whatever the outcome of the United States Supreme Court's review
of Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,"2 courts will continue to
rely on advertising as a means of determining whether sufficient contacts
exist for the court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. With new
and ingenious ways to advertise being created every day, it is important
for plaintiffs to be attentive when researching the defendant's advertis-
ing and for possible defendants to be aware of the risks inherent in vari-
198. State ex. reL Circus Circus Reno v. Pope, 854 P.2d 461, 466 (Or. 1993).
199. Dirks v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 642 F. Supp. 971 (D. Kan. 1986).
200. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 383-86 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
201. A poor example is Meyers v. Hamilton Corp., 693 P.2d 904 (Ariz. 1984), where the
court was presented with only the advertisement. There was no indication of where and when
the ad ran other than the fact that the fare from Phoenix, Arizona was listed.
202. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Given the fact that many of the lower courts look to the defend-
ant's additional conduct in order to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reason-
able, it is not unlikely that the Supreme Court will retain Justice O'Connor's test requiring
additional conduct.
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ous ad campaigns. Today a promotion for a product is as likely to be on
an athlete's hat as on a full page ad in a magazine.20 3 Whatever the
form, there are a number of ways that advertising can create amenabil-
ity. When the amount of advertising rises to the level of solicitation,
when the advertising is related to the commission of a tort in the forum
state, or when the advertising is related to substantial other contacts, the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction is justified.
As for ABC Limited and its attempt to limit liability, it is likely that
if ABC plans its ad campaign carefully it will not be subject to suit in a
foreign state. Limiting its liability will mean limiting both its market and
sales. ABC must be certain that its advertising does not cross into states
where it does not want to be amenable. This strategy requires checking
the signal strength of the radio stations and television stations and
checking the circulation of newspapers and magazines it advertises in.
An injured party must be equally scrupulous to determine whether the
defendant's advertisements are more than just random, fortuitous acts.
ANDREW J. ZBARACxi*
203. See Gavigan v. Walt Disney World Inc., 646 F. Supp 786 (1986) (discussing the vari-
ous promotional campaigns for Disney World).
* Special thanks to Marquette University Law School Professor Christine Wiseman for
editorial assistance.
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